"FOR REGIONAL SUPREMACY
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
IRAN'S RACE
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
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© 2008 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 13 Tel Hai Street, Jerusalem, Israel Tel. 972-2-561-9281 Fax. 972-2-561-9112 Email: jcpa@netvision.net.il www.jcpa.org ISBN : 978-965-218-064-3
Production Director: Adam Shay
Associate Editor: Noah Pollak Production Coordinator: Pablo Tittel Graphic Design: Studio Rami & Jaki Photos Credit: AP Photo
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Contents
Foreword: Iran’s Race for Regional Supremacy
Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon
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Introduction: The Diplomatic Implications of the Growing Iranian Threat
Dr. Dore Gold
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The Second Lebanon War: From Territory to Ideology
Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon
Iranian Strategic Vulnerabilities: Implications for Policy Options to Halt the Iranian Nuclear Program
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Zeevi Farkash
38
Iran’s “Second” Islamic Revolution: Its Challenge to the West
Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira and Daniel Diker
44 62 68
The Global Range of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program
Uzi Rubin
Hamas: “Glocal” Islamism
Prof. Martin Kramer
The Hamas Regime in the Gaza Strip: An Iranian Satellite that Threatens Regional Stability
Lt.-Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi
About the Authors About the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Maps
Rocket Threats Emanating from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip Iranian Political-Military Involvement Across the Middle East and South Asia The Global Reach of Iranian-Sponsored Terrorism Shiite Populations ֿin the Middle East
74 82 84
Iran’s Growing Missile Capabilities: Domestic Production and Foreign Procurement
Dore Gold
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Acknowledgments
The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs expresses its profound thanks and appreciation to Dr. Roy H. Stern and Steven E. Stern for their vision and generosity in making this monograph possible.
The editor expresses his deep appreciation to Professor Bernard Lewis and Ambassador Uri Lubrani for their insights and wise counsel on the chapter, "Iran's Second Islamic Revolution."
FOREWORD
IRAN’S RACE FOR REGIONAL SUPREMACY
Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon
A gunman holds his AK-47 as he stands in a Sunni street in front of a big poster showing portraits of Shiite cleric Imam Moussa al-Sadr (top), leader of the Shiite Amal movement and Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabi Beri (left), and Hizbullah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah (right), during the Hizbullahled attack on Beirut that left scores dead and wounded, May 9, 2008.
The publication of this updated and newly titled edition of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs’ 2007 policy monograph, Iran, Hizbullah, Hamas and the Global Jihad: a New Conflict Paradigm for the West, comes at a critical moment. Since the first edition was published in the aftermath of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, regional events have only vindicated the study’s thesis: that Iran’s use of terror proxies in its race for regional supremacy is the primary cause of instability in the Middle East, not the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Since the 2006 war with Hizbullah, Iran has sponsored terror operations in the Middle East states amenable to the West, including Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf states, in the service of destabilizing the governments of those states. It has escalated its direct attacks through organizations it backs – with money, training and weaponry – like the Hamas military takeover of Gaza from the Palestinian Authority leader, Mahmoud Abbas, in June 2007 and Hizbullah’s near coup d’état in Beirut in May 2008 against Prime Minister Fouad Seniora’s government. In this context, Teheran has also expanded its alliances with numerous Palestinian terror groups and employed them to step up attacks against Israel. Thus, Palestinian Gaza and parts of Judea and Samaria – the West Bank – that are controlled by the Palestinian Authority have become new “theaters” for the spread of Iranian influence and control. With its continuing drive for strategic weapons, Iran not only poses a regional threat, but even a global challenge affecting the security of the Western alliance as a whole. Collectively, the articles in this updated monograph, titled Iran’s Race for Regional Supremacy, address an essential question: Have the Western powers exaggerated the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while derogating the importance of the new Iranian role in the region?
This new edition provides the necessary context to consider this question wisely, especially in light of the dramatic developments throughout the region that have transpired since the publication of the first edition in January 2007.
Iran and Al-Qaeda: Regional Moves
Iran has accelerated its quest for regional supremacy via its mobilization of both Shiite and Sunni terror proxies, including Hizbullah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq and in the Gulf, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al Aksa Martyrs’ Brigades in the Palestinian territories. Since the Second Lebanon War, Iran has spent more than a billion dollars rebuilding Southern Lebanon and bolstering Hizbullah there.1 Despite the serious blow the IDF inflicted on Hizbullah during the war, Iran and Syria have increased Hizbullah’s pre-war rocket arsenals by almost a third, to at least 30,000 rockets. Defense Minister Ehud Barak told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in February 2008 that Hizbullah “now possesses three times as many rockets as it did prior to the Second Lebanon War,” suggesting that Hizbullah may have acquired as many as 60,000 rockets.2 Hizbullah’s Iranian-supplied land-to-sea missile inventory has also likely tripled. 3 The IDF believes that Iran is arming Hizbullah with long-range missiles capable of striking targets 300 km. away and other advanced weaponry. Some of this ordinance has been disguised as civilian cargo and smuggled overland across Turkey into Syria and then to Hizbullah in Lebanon. In May 2007, for example, Turkish authorities intercepted a train traveling from Iran to Syria carrying Hizbullah weaponry.4
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Foreword
Dore Gold
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of Sunni and Shiite groups in destabilizing proWestern governments, whether in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, or against Western-oriented leaders of the Palestinian Authority. In June 2007, Hamas’ violent takeover of Gaza transformed the Strip into the region’s first “Islamic Arab Emirate.” This was an important achievement for Iran. It is also the region’s first example of the Muslim Brotherhood’s governmental control of a contiguous territory and its population. Iran’s direct backing of Hamas via Khaled Mashaal and the Damascus-based Hamas leadership has essentially transformed Gaza into a base from which to export Iranian terror against Israel and expand Teheran’s political control in the region. Iran now has an additional gateway, aside from Syria and Lebanon, to the Arab world – and one that poses a threat to Israel’s Arab neighbors, Egypt and Jordan. The establishment of “Hamastan” in Gaza also radiates victory to the jihadists of many stripes, including those fighting the U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq. More importantly, Hamastan has also signaled the weakness of the West’s political will in confronting and defeating Iran and its proxies militarily. Iran remains one of the major destabilizing influences in Iraq and has continued, through its Qods Force operatives, to train, arm, and fund Iraqi Shiite militias,8 despite the U.S. capture of several senior members of the Qods Force in early 2007. The U.S. Coalition Forces Commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, has noted in subsequent congressional testimony that, “it is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hizbullah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.”9
Palestinians pass by the destroyed part of the Egyptian-Gaza border in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, Jan. 31, 2008. Hundreds of thousands poured across the breached border.
Hizbullah has placed hundreds of rocket installations south of the Litani River, under heavy civilian cover in Shiite villages and rural areas.
Since the 2006 war, Hizbullah’s freedom of movement in Southern Lebanon has been limited by the presence of nearly 14,000 UNIFIL troops and at least 10,000 Lebanese government forces. However, Hizbullah has still managed to place hundreds of rocket installations south of the Litani River, under heavy civilian cover in Shiite villages and rural areas. In a tacit agreement with Hizbullah, UNIFIL and Lebanese troops have avoided operating in many areas in Southern Lebanon. On occasion, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL have even coordinated their actions with Hizbullah.5 In short, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL have not enforced the security measures stipulated by UN Security Council Resolution 1701.6 Under Iran’s auspices, it is little surprise that Hizbullah and Syria have continued their political subversion of Lebanon. Hizbullah boycotted the Lebanese parliament in 2007 in order to topple the pro-Western prime minister, Fouad Seniora. Hizbullah also works to facilitate Syria’s hold over Lebanon, having prevented the election of a proWestern president on at least 19 occasions as of May 13, 2008.7 In short, Hizbullah has continued expending a great deal of energy to transform Lebanon into a tightly woven piece of Iran’s regional revolutionary fabric. Lebanon was also the battleground for the activities of the radical Sunni Islamic group Fatah al-Islam, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate backed by Syria and Iran. Fatah al-Islam’s bloody battles in 2007 against Lebanese security forces in and around Palestinian refugee camps illustrate the growing complicity
Iran’s Nuclear Program
Perhaps the most vital component of Iran’s race for regional supremacy is the regime’s fast-developing nuclear weapons program, which has continued despite international diplomatic and economic antagonism. Unfortunately, the publication in November 2007 of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate sent a misleading and even contradictory message on the state of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The report’s opening sentence – “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Teheran halted its nuclear weapons program” – appeared to vindicate Iranian denials.10 However, one of the report’s primary conclusions
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Foreword
is that Iran has continued to enrich uranium at an accelerated pace. And there is no debate in U.S. or Western circles over the fact that enriched uranium is equally necessary for both civilian and military nuclear programs. As former UN Ambassador John Bolton has suggested, the distinction between Iran’s “military” and “civilian” programs is highly artificial.11 Therefore, the NIE does not attest to a cessation of Teheran’s military nuclear program; rather, the report provided Iran immediate relief from international pressure while helping Ahmadinejad calm dissent within the regime, if only temporarily. The NIE has also lowered the prospect of U.S.-led military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. As a result of the Arab establishment’s concern that the NIE represented a clear example of U.S. hesitation to confront the Iranian regime, the Gulf Cooperation Council, an alliance of Gulf states established 27 years ago to counter Iran, seems to have collapsed.12 This was illustrated sharply when Qatar, shortly after the NIE’s release and without consulting its fellow Gulf members, invited Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to deliver the keynote address at the 2008 GCC summit in Doha. It was no coincidence that Ahmadinejad was invited to address the GCC on the eve of President George W. Bush’s January 2008 Middle East visit. This was an example of the Sunni establishment signaling the U.S. that it was keeping its options open – that it was beginning to view Iran as the winning horse.
To Israel’s south, Hamas’ strategically planned destruction of the Gaza-Egypt border fence in January 2008 enabled jihadi groups such as alQaeda, which have already used Egyptian Sinai as a rear base, to reach Gaza more easily. Al-Qaedaaffiliated operatives, some of whom infiltrated from Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen, have been active in Gaza since 2006. Over the past several years, al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations have also emerged in Gaza, including Jaish al-Islam (Army of Islam), which was responsible for the kidnapping of BBC journalist Alan Johnston. Other jihadi groups were also formed, such as Jaish al-Umma (Army of the Nation), Al-Qaeda in Palestine, and Mujahidin Beit al-Makdes (Holy Warriors of Jerusalem), which attacked the American International School in Gaza in January 2008.16
Iran and the Palestinian Authority
Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip was one of the most significant regional developments of 2007. Gaza is now the first Islamic Arab emirate in the Middle East, and represents a likely irrevocable victory of Islamists over the Palestinian and Arab nationalists. Both Egypt and the Palestinian Authority reportedly pointed to Iran’s major role in the Hamas takeover of Gaza. According to Tawfik Tirawi, head of PA intelligence, the Hamas takeover in Gaza “was coordinated with Iran which provided training and weapons and was informed of every step.”17 Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Gheit charged that Iran’s intervention in Gaza and Iraq threatened Egypt’s national security.18 Notwithstanding Gaza’s transformation into a de facto sovereign Hamas state, Gaza’s status as an Islamist platform began after Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza. Between 2005 and late 2007, some 230 tons of explosives, including scores of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, were smuggled into Gaza via underground tunnels from Egyptian Sinai into Gaza.19 Since January 2007 alone, more than 3,000 Palestinian rockets and mortars have been fired at Israel by Iraniansponsored groups.20 Since Hamas’ breach of the Gaza-Egypt border in January 2008, tons of additional explosives have been transferred overland from Egypt to Gaza.21 The breach also enabled Hamas to bring back operatives who had left Gaza for training in Syria and Iran, including snipers, explosives experts, rocket experts, and engineers.22 In March 2008, Hamas officials admitted for the first time that hundreds of their top operatives have trained in
Moshe Yaalon
Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates
Sunni jihadi organizations linked to al-Qaeda refocused some of their activity during 2007 closer to Israel’s borders with Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.13 During President Bush’s January 2008 visit to Israel, al-Qaeda affiliates launched a 107mm rocket from Southern Lebanon at the northern Israeli town of Shlomi.14 In June 2007, Fatah al-Islam, an al-Qaeda offshoot based in Lebanon, fired rockets at the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona, hitting the city’s industrial zone.15
The establishment of “Hamastan” in Gaza also radiates victory to the jihadists of many stripes, including those fighting the U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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ROCKET THREATS TO ISRAEL EMANATING FROM LEBANON AND THE GAZA STRIP
Lebanon
RANGES OF HIZBULLAH ROCKETS DEPLOYED IN LEBANON
122 MM “Grad” Katyusha, 20.4 km/12.6 miles Improved 122 mm Grad Katyusha, range up to 50 km/31 miles 220 MM Rocket, 70 km/44 miles Zalzal 200-250 km/ 125 – 156 miles
Kiryat Shmona Nahariya
Tsafed
Syria
Haifa
Tiberias
Hadera
Netanya
Tel Aviv
Ashdod Ashkelon Kiryat Gat Sderot Netivot
Ben-Gurion International Airport
Jerusalem
Gaza
Beer Sheva
RANGES OF PALESTINIAN ROCKETS DEPLOYED IN THE
Qassam II, 9-13 km / 6-8 miles. 122 MM “Grad” Katyusha, 20.4 km/12.6 miles 175 MM Rocket (Iranian origin), 26 km/16 miles
GAZA STRIP”.
Jordan
Ranges are approximate as launch sites for different rocket systems will vary.
Introduction
Eilat
Syria and Iran under the aegis of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Hamas officials noted that Iran’s training of Hamas is similar to Iran’s training of Hizbullah.23 Massive Iranian financial support continued to flow into Hamas coffers in 2007, reaching between $120 and $200 million. 24 In December 2007 alone, some $100 million was smuggled into Gaza by senior Hamas members returning from the annual haj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Hundreds of millions of dollars have since likely crossed Gaza’s broken border. 25
In March 2008, Hamas officials admitted for the first time that hundreds of their top operatives have In view of these developments in Syria, the policies trained in Syria and Iran under of United States, the Western alliance, and Israel are problematic and require urgent review. the aegis of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Hamas ofIran and the Western Alliance ficials noted that Iran’s training of of the U.S.-led Western alliance to Hamas is similar to Iran’s training The failure diplomatically and economically and isolate Iran the failure to make Iran pay a price for specific of Hizbullah.
For its part, Hamas could likely take control of the West Bank, or at least create major disturbances, if the IDF security presence there was significantly relaxed or removed. One important conclusion is that the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas lacks the ability, political will, or both to create a secure, accountable entity in Gaza and the West Bank governed by the rule of law. While Hamas influence in the West Bank is widespread and growing, Iran has used money, ideology, and training to help influence other Palestinian terror groups in the West Bank, such as the Al Aksa Martyrs’ Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, despite the fact that they too are Sunni and not Shiite groups. acts of aggression have emboldened the regime throughout the Middle East.
Dispatching thousands of mujahadin from Syria to Iraq.27 Arming Hizbullah in Lebanon in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701. Training and hosting Palestinian terror groups and Iranian Qods Force operatives in Damascus. Assassinating Lebanese political leaders, journalists, and opponents and directly interfering in Lebanon’s political process in an effort to restore Syrian control. In an egregious violation of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, building a nuclear reactor with North Korean help. Strengthening its political, security, and economic alliance with Iran. Upgrading its arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles, chemical weapons, and the doubling of its rocket inventory compared to 2006.28
For example, Iran’s successful “probes” of both Britain and the United States in separate confrontations in the Persian Gulf sent a clear message about the West’s continued reluctance to confront the Iranian regime. In March 2007, Qods Force naval operatives kidnapped 15 British naval personnel and held them for nearly two weeks before releasing them “as a gift of the Iranians.” In January and April 2008, IRGC speedboats charged U.S. naval warships in the Strait of Hormuz, nearly triggering armed confrontations. In these instances, neither British nor U.S. forces responded militarily to the direct provocations by the Iranians.
Syria
Syria has continued to call for peace negotiations with Israel as a tactic ostensibly aimed at regaining the Golan Heights. However, Damascus’ real agenda is to ease international pressure on the regime. At the same time, Syria and Iran have deepened their strategic cooperation,26 while Syria has continued its policy of destabilizing the region via:
The Palestinian Authority, Israel, and the Western Alliance
The November 2007 Annapolis peace “meeting,” the subsequent Paris Donor Conference, and President George W. Bush’s follow-up visit to Jerusalem and Ramallah all reflect the strategic inertia of U.S., European,..."
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